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Case Comment
UNITED STATES V. E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY - The
famous DuPont case was in the courts for ten years. This comment
is primarily an analysis of a few interesting points made by LaBuy J.,
of the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion dated November, 1959,' on
reference for settlement from the Supreme Court as a result of its
finding on June 3, 1957,2 that the DuPont Company had violated
the Anti-Trust Law. It is therefore necessary to review the Supreme
Court's findings briefly to understand LaBuy J.'s judgment. Much
of the argument in this protracted litigation is relevant to Canadian
problems, and the cardinal emphasis will be placed upon matters of
interest to Canadian readers.
Although DuPont had been charged under several provisions of
the American Anti-Trust laws, the Supreme Court found it guilty
only of a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The relevant part
of that section provided: 3
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition,
or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
A majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Brennan J.,4 held that, although General Motors and DuPont were
not competitors, nevertheless a violation of the Act had occurred.
This reversed the exhaustive opinion of LaBuy J., which ran to 100
pages in a close analysis of -the forty-year relationship between these
two industrial giants.5 The violation resulted from DuPont's pur-
chase, in the years from 1917 to 1919, of General Motors' stock
which at the date of trial totalled 63,000,000 shares, representing a
23% interest in the company.6 The objects of this purchase, as
shown by voluminous evidence, were two-fold. First, the directors
of DuPont felt that an investment in the automobile industry would
be a profitable long-term employment of capital. Second, it was felt
that such a purchase would protect DuPont against a loss of its
position as commanding supplier in the field of enamels and other
chemical products used by the automobile industry. There was
genuine reason to fear that the success of the Ford Motor Company
might lead to Ford's investment in supplier companies, thus eventu-
1177 F. Supp. 1.2 353 U.S. 586, 77 S. Ct. 872.3 Amended in 1950. Not material.
4 77 S. Ct. 872 at p. 877.
5 126 F. Supp. 235.6 This original purchase by DuPont is closely analogous to the investment
made last autumn by Canada Cement Ltd. in shares of Standard Paving and
Materials Ltd.
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ally freezing out independent chemical producers. Indeed, the success
of Ford very nearly resulted in bankruptcy for General Motors in
the early twenties. Faced with a threatened loss of this substantial
investment, DuPont loaned some of its managerial talent and capital
to the floundering company. The result of such infusion was that,
although more than one hundred automobile producers were defunct
by 1932, General Motors survived.
With this background it is possible to examine the majority
opinion in the DuPont case. One fascinating feature of the opinion
is that DuPont was convicted in 1957 for a purchase made 40 years
earlier that had not infringed the public interest but might do so
in the future. The following excerpts from the opinion of Brennan J.
are noteworthy: 7
We agree with the trial court that considerations of price, quality and
service were not overlooked by DuPont or General Motors. Pride in its
products and its high financial stake in General Motors' success would
naturally lead DuPont to try to supply the best....
... We repeat that, the test of a violation of s. 7 is whether, at the time
of suit, there is a reasonable probability that the acquisition is likely to
result in the condemned restraints. . . . The fire that was kindled in
1917 continues to smolder. It burned briskly to forge the ties that bind
the General Motors market to DuPont, and if it has quieted down, it
remains hot, and.. . is likely at any time to blaze and make the fusion
complete. (Italics are mine.)
The celestial fire that impregnates the last sentence would be
excellent embellishment for a tract against big business, but seems
out of place in a court of law.
Another question arises in reference to the Court's holding that
the test must be applied "at the time of suit". The dissenting view
was that the Government must show DuPont's purchases tended to
create a monopoly at the date of the purchase. In view of the weak-
ness of General Motors at the time, this would be impossible. Fur-
thermore, this interpretation would rule out that part of the Govern-
ment's case which was based on the fact that the subsequent broad
diffusion of General Motors stock among thousands of small share-
holders gave DuPont's 23L% interest effective control.
The wisdom of this viewpoint is apparent, from a utilitarian
aspect, when one considers the ramifications of the Supreme Court's
opinion in the DuPont case. It means that an external authority can
apply a new set of motives at any time in the future to invalidate a
formerly lawful act.
Although the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914, this is the first
case in which it was applied to a vertical acquisition.8 Furthermore,
it is the first time it was used against an investment that had taken
7 77 S. Ct. 872 at p. 884.
S A key point to note is the difference between horizontal and vertical
mergers. Generally speaking, a horizontal merger results when a company
acquires control of another company competing in the same market; a
vertical merger (or integration) results when a supplying company acquires
control of a corporate customer of its products.
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place years before. In regard to these two points, the vigorous dis-
senting opinion of Burton and Frankfurter JJ. is instructive: 9
The Court, in accepting both of these contentions, disregards the langu-
age and purpose of the Statute, 40 years of administrative practice, and
all the precedents except one District Court decision. The sweeping
character of the Court's pronouncement is further evidenced from the
fact that to make its case the Court requires no showing of any misuse
of a stock interest either at the time of acquisition or subsequently to
gain preferential treatment from the acquired corporation. All that is
required, if this case be our guide, is that some court, in some future
year be persuaded that a "reasonable probability" then exists that an
advantage over competitors in a narrowly construed market may be
obtained as a result of the stock interest.
The dissenters also point out that the majority judgment is based
on the "fact" that DuPont had no standing as a General Motors
supplier before 1917, and gained a commanding position afterward:10
With these words the Court overturns the unequivocal findings of the
District Court to the effect that DuPont was a principal supplier to
General Motors prior to the 1917-1919 stock purchase, that DuPont main-
tained its position in the years following the stock purchasesi and that
for the entire 30-year period preceding the suit, General Motors' pur-
chases of DuPont's products were based solely on the competitive merits
of those products.
This is an accurate summation of LaBuy J.'s opinion1 1 which
analyzed in detail all purchases of DuPont products made by General
Motors. He found that the various divisions of General Motors bought
separately and competed with each other. Where DuPont products,
like Duco enamel, were used exclusively, it was because they were
superior to others, as shown by the purchases by Ford, Chrysler and
other companies. The decentralization of authority at General Motors
was an important point. Each division was an autonomous company,
and executives from other divisions were not even allowed in to
examine the models. As a result, some divisions of General Motors
continued to buy products of DuPont competitors at a time when
other divisions were sticking to DuPont products. Duco was used
by Cadillac for three years before other divisions began to buy it,
and this was after Ford had begun to use it on all its products.
In spite of such hard economic facts, DuPont was convicted.' 2
The Supreme Court referred the matter to the District Court to
effect a settlement of the complex problems posed by its findings.
LaBuy J.'s decision on the reference is another lengthy, reasoned
look at the economics of the case. The Government urged that
DuPont be ordered to divest itself of its 63,000,000 shares, which
were worth $3.5 billion at the date, by declaring the shares as divi-
dends to DuPont shareholders. They would thus be taxable at the
full rate, ranging up to 92%. The Court was also asked that, all
General Motors shares which Delaware and Christiana Securities
9 Supra, footnote 10 at p. 885.
10 Supra, footnote 10 at p. 895.
,1Supra, footnote 4.
12 Supra, footnote 2.
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(two holding companies) would receive under this plan as large
Dupont shareholders, be sold by a trustee. Since these two companies
held approximately 13,500,000 shares, this would mean that more
than 19,000,000 General Motors shares would be sold from their
holdings alone. If these large figures are meaningless, it might be
pointed out that, even on a day of active trading, General Motors
shares rarely turn over a volume of 50,000 shares on the stock
exchanges.
LaBuy J. points out the obviously disastrous effect that such a
plan would have on the 230,000 DuPont and the 700,000 General
Motors stockholders. He reviewed the testimony from dozens of
shareholders in the two companies who ranged from individuals
owning less than twenty shares, to a few with substantial holdings.
They all testified that if the Government's demands were accepted,
they would be forced to sell most of their holdings immediately. It
is clear that such a plan would result in millions of shares being
dumped on the market in a few weeks' time, which would probably
lead to a market crash of 1929 proportions. The shareholders would
thus be punished for a crime to which they were never parties.
Furthermore, the two companies involved would find it very difficult
to raise capital needed for growth.
It may be objected that such arguments are irrelevant. If DuPont
is guilty, then the price must be exacted. "Let him look to his bond,"
Shylock shrieked, and the law was not to take cognizance of the
indisputable fact that Antonio would die as a result. Franz Kafka
depicts in his novel, The Trial, a system of law that exists as a para-
lysing miasma, obsessed with its narrow legalities, and totally oblivi-
ous of human rights. However, law can never operate in a vacuum.
Decisions like Donoghue (M'Allister) v. Stevenson13 are examples of
a view that law must not cease to serve human needs.
With such a terrible prospect of economic chaos, the learned
judge in effecting the settlement, masterfully presented a way out
of the dilemma. He stated that the Government's delay had created
a detrimental reliance, an equitable doctrine that sounds strangely
foreign to anti-trust law:14
Moreover, the Government itself cannot escape responsibility for the
plight of these stockholders. At the time of acquisition, there existed a
very small fraction of the present number of stockholders of the cor-
porations involved. It waited some thirty years after the acquisition
occurred before bringing this action.
It should, therefore, recognize that stockholders who purchased DuPont
in those intervening years had every reason to believe that DuPont's
holding of General Motors was entirely proper and legal.
His conclusion was that DuPont be stripped of its voting rights
on its General Motors shares, but that it be allowed to retain the
shares as an investment. The voting rights were to pass through to
13 [1932] A.C. 562.
14 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 13.
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DuPont shareholders, giving them full rights as General Motors
shareholders at General Motors meetings. Furthermore, no DuPont
representatives were to sit on the Board of General Motors.
This is an ingenious solution that should remove all taint from
the investment, even where the most zealous "trustbusters" on the
Supreme Court are concerned. It is amusing to reflect that Frank-
furter J., who wrote such a scathing indictment of the Court in the
dissent, was appointed by President Roosevelt for his liberal views,
and was generally regarded by American conservatives as a fiery
radical. The Warren Court has been the centre of controversy for
six years because of its alleged "legislative" actions. If Justice Frank-
furter's views be correct, then the Court was here overturning judicial
precedent to carry out a legislative objective.
The American Constitution is built on the premises that func-
tions are divided between the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
branches of Government. It is true that a certain overlap is neces-
sary, but it is questionable whether an appointed Court should usurp
the functions of the democratically elected legislature. If LaBuy J.'s
settlement is upset by the Supreme Court in favour of the Govern-
ment's plan, then the question of the Court's role will become a
vitally important political question, since the resultant economic dis-
location will frustrate the legislator's plans for a booming economy.
A Bill was introduced in the American Senate last year which
sought to curb the Supreme Court from some of its more enthusiastic
ventures. It was voted down, but the fact that a number of dis-
tinguished legislators voted for it shows how deep the mistrust of
the Supreme Judicial authority is in many thoughtful quarters. This
reprimand may well be instrumental in preventing the Court from
overruling the learned District Court Judge. If his decision stands,
it could quite conceivably be a watershed in the annals of Govern-
ment regulation of business for its judicious balancing of the respec-
tive interests of the general public and the investor.
DONALD COCK*
HARGREAVES v. BRETHERTON - TORT - PERJURY - LACK OF REM-
EDY - The claims of those who have suffered from the abuses of
judicial proceedings have for centuries been faced with the rule that:
... neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or Judge, can be put to answer,
civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.1
The issue was recently raised again in the English case of
Hargreaves v. Bretherton,2 a decision of the Queen's Bench Division
*Mr. Cock is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Rex v. Skinner (1772), Lofft 55 at p. 56, 98 E.R. at p. 530.
For the problems of tort liability arising from activities of public ser-
vants see R. J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Calif. L. Rev.(1959).2 [1958] 3 W.L.R. 463, [1958] 3 All E.R. 122.
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